Heterogeneous Behavioral Rules in the Oligopolistic Case by Markus Pasche
Heterogeneous Behavioral Rules in the Oligopolistic
Case1
Markus Pasche
Abstract: In a static symmetric duopoly the set of behavioral rules is extended
to dierent types of markup pricing. Using an equilibrium concept suggested in
Pasche (2001), it is shown that dependend on the markup neither pure Cournot
nor pure Bertrand behavior is a behavioral equilibrium prole. Instead, there is a
rationale for the usage of simple heuristics. The presence of markup rules leads to
Stackelberg outcomes. Furthermore, pure markup behavior is more competitive
than in Cournot case but less competitive than in Bertrand case. It is shown,
that multiple behavioral equilibria and heterogeneous behavior may arise, where
at least one player uses price setting strategies.
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JEL-Classi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1 Introduction
Since the studies of Hall/Hitch (1939) it is occasionally claimed that the analysis of
industrial organization should focus on empirically observable types of supply behavi-
or. Some of the most prominent heuristics in oligopoly are dierent types of markup
pricing: Since suppliers often have no idea about marginal cost and marginal revenues
they try to acchieve a price as a xed ratio (or a xed amount) to the average cost. One
major problem of such a heuristic behavior is that in general it is in contrast to the
assumption of rational prot maximizing agents which is essential for microeconomic
reasoning. Therefore there exist more empirical studies on markup-pricing than theo-
retical models which account for these heuristics. Grant/Quiggin (1994), for example,
analyse the case of oligopolistic competition where the markups are chosen optimally.
They show that the resulting equilibrium with markup strategies is more competitive
than the Cournot solution.
However, it is by no means clear why such heuristics should be preferred to optimizing
behavior, i.e. there is no economic explanation for the evidence of these rules of thumb.
It seems plausible to argue that under the condition of competition heuristic rules will
be ruled out in the long run by maximizing behavior. The usage of simple rules is then
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1due to short run limitations of agents abilities or due to market imperfections. In
this paper, however, it is shown that the opposite claim can be true: simple rules may
outperform optimizing behavior and may constitute an equilibrium.
Things are getting more complicated if either the price or the quantity can be chosen
as a strategic variable. It is well known that under rather general conditions pricing
strategies will lead to more competitive outcomes than quantity strategies (Chang 1985,
Vives 1985). Under certain conditions (like non-decreasing returns of scale and a very
close substitution between goods) no economically reasonable equilibrium in pricing
strategies exists. These arguments justify the assumption of quantity setting. However,
one objection is that pure quantity setting behavior is empirically less relevant and the
emergence of prices in markets remains \somewhat mysterious" (Shapiro 1989, p.343).
The paper shows for the case of a multi-stage symmetric duopoly game that there
exists an incentive to use simple price or quantity setting rules. We use an equilibrium
concept which does not only account for the chosen strategies but also for the rules,
how these strategies are chosen (cf. Pasche 2001). Following Rubinstein (1998, pp. 3)
this broader notion of equilibrium allows for the analysis of arbitrary types of boun-
dedly rational decision behavior and may provide a rationale for some of them. We are
interested in equilibria where the players behave dierently even when the demand and
cost functions are strictly symmetric. Furthermore it is analysed how the equilibrium
structure depends on price or quantity strategies and how competitive equilibria with
markup rules can be compared with Cournot and Bertrand solutions.
2 Behavioral Equilibria with Markup Rules
2.1 Mixing optimizing and markup behavior
In the following section a dierentiated duopoly with complete information is conside-
red. Both players have a quadratic cost function C(qi) = cqi + dq2
i;i = 1;2, with qi as
the quantity produced by rm i and c;d  0 as parameters. The demand scheme is
assumed to be linear with pi = a bqi+bqj; a > c;b > 0; 2 [0;1];i = 1;2;i 6= j. The
parameter  captures the degree of substitution: For  = 0 the goods are completely
dierentiated and the players act as monopolists. With  = 1 the goods are perfect
substitutes, i.e. they are homogeneous. Let i 2 fqi;pig be the strategy variable of
player i. In case of i = pi the linear demand scheme can simply be solved for qi. If
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 2 [0;1) because of 0  c < a. The reaction functions
fB and fC represent the behavioral rule of payo maximization in the case of price
competition (fB for Bertrand behavior) and quantity competition (fC for Cournot
behavior). A vector (fB;fB) or (fC;fC) is called a behavioral prole in contrast to
the strategy prole (p1;p2) or (q1;q2). The Cournot-Nash solution (q
1;q
2) can also be
denoted as (fC(q
2);fC(q
1)) and the Bertrand-Nash solution (p
1;p
2) can be written as
(fB(p
2);fB(p
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with Z1 = a2(
   1)2 > 0 and Z2 = 2(b + d) > 0. The upper index BB (resp. CC)
denotes the behavioral prole, where the rst letter describes the own behavioral rule
and the second letter the opponents rule. For homogeneous goods ( = 1) Bertrand
competition leads to the competitive result, i.e. price equals marginal costs. Hence, if
the cost function is linear (d = 0) prots are zero, while in the case of a quadratic cost
function the payos are still positive. Comparing CC with BB, obviously CC > BB
for all  > 0 , i.e. the Cournot scenario is less competitive.
In addition to these optimizing rules there are two heuristic rules of thumb, where the
price is calculated by average cost and a markup. In case of the behavioral rule fM, the
price or quantity will be set in order to let pi=AC(qi) = mi constant, where AC(qi) =
c + dqi are the average costs and mi 2 IR
+ is the markup ratio. The prot per unit is
then a xed proportion of average cost. Let fN denote another behavioral rule where
the prot per unit is xed by pi AC(qi) = mi with mi 2 IR
+ as the markup amount. A
game-theoretic analysis of these heuristics is not very common. Particularly, there is a
lack of economic reasoning why these rules are used by (boundedly) rational players. To
give a rationale for the usage of these rules we extend the equilibrium concept to deal
with non-maximizing behavioral rules. For this reason let 
 be the behavioral repertoire
of the players which contains dierent rules of decision making. In the present case we
3have 
 = ffC;fM;fNg when i = j = x and 
 = ffB;fM;fNg when i = j = p.
Since both markup rules can be played with price or quantity decisions, the rules fM
and fN actually have to be indexed by the chosen strategy variable. In order to keep
the notation simple we suppress this index. Since the achievement of the markup mi
depends also on the opponents decision, the corresponding reaction function can be
derived. When i = pi; i = 1;2, the reaction function of both markup rules can be
calculated by solving the demand function for qi, inserting it into pi = miAC(qi) (or
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behavioral equilibria, since an equilibrium is a state where no player has a reason to se-
lect another strategy: in these behavioral equilibria the prot maximizer cannot achieve
a higher payo by changing the price and the markup agent realises the given mi (cf.
Pasche 2001). Cournot and Bertrand (or in general: Nash) solutions are obviously speci-
al cases of behavioral equilibria where the players are bounded to maximizing behavior.
The existence of a behavioral equilibrium with markup rules requires that the markup
mi is chosen from a subset of IR
+ so that there exists at least one i which realizes mi
in equilibrium. In other words: the markup player has to x a reasonable markup. This
condition is less demanding than the assumption that markups are chosen optimal-
ly. The latter case will be assumed later on. When all behavioral rules and markups
are Common Knowledge, the agents are able to anticipate the prevailing behavioral
equilibrium.
It is reasonable to argue that even non-maximizing (often called \boundedly rational")
players will prefer high payos to lower payos, if they have the opportunity to acchie-
ve them. Hence we assume that due to calculation or a learning process the markups
are adjusted so that they maximize the payo in equilibrium (Grant/Quiggin 1994
follow the same idea). This case will be called a behavioral equilibrium with a balanced
parametrization (cf. Pasche 2001). In case of price competition we have ve possible
behavioral proles (fM;fM), (fN;fN), (fB;fM), (fB;fN), (fM;fN) in addition to
the Bertrand case (fB;fB), on which the selections of optimal markups depend. We
assume that the behavioral rules are xed. On the rst stage of the game players se-
lect their (optimal) markups. On the second stage the usual oligopoly game is played.
4First consider the behavioral prole (fB;fM), which leads to a behavioral equilibrium
(fB(p
j);fM(mj;p
i)) with the payos BM
i (mj) and MB
j (mj). The optimal parametri-
zation of rule fM is given by m
j = argmaxmj MB
j (mj) which has a unique solution
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Calculations show that MB
j  BB
j . Hence, a player can benet from selecting rule
fM instead of fB if the opponent is a prot maximizing player. The same result can
be derived for the markup rule fN. In this case the reaction function is linear in mj






j . The explanation is simple: In the (p1;p2)-space the
markup mj parametrizes the reaction function fM(mj;pi) (resp. fN(mj;pi)) so that it
intersects the Bertrand reaction function fB at the point where the latter is a tangent
to the highest possible iso-prot curve of player j. Markup agents with a xed optimal
markup then act like Bertrand-Stackelberg rst mover, but in a static duopoly game.
This can easily be proven by inserting the reaction function pi = fB(pj) into the prot
equation of player i and calculating the optimal p
i.
Now let i = qi i = 1;2. The reaction functions of the markup rules are now dened in
quantities and can be derived by inserting pi = miAC(qi) (or pi = mi +AC(qi), resp.)










j = N(mj;qi) =
a   mj   c   bqi
b + d
: (10)
The eqilibrium payos are also parametrized by mj. We analyze the behavioral prole
(fC;fM) with the corresponding equilibrium (fC(q
j);fM(mj;q
i)). The unique optimal
parametrization m
j = argmaxmj MC
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5which is the Cournot-Stackelberg solution. Again, the markup agent takes the position




j in case of an optimal
parametrization with m
j. The explanation is the same as in case of pricing strategies:
in the (q1;q2)-space the markup mj is chosen so that the reaction function fM(mj;qi)
(resp. fN(mj;qi)) intersects with the Cournot reaction function fC in the point where
the latter is a tangent to the highest possible iso-prot curve of player j.
Up to now we have assumed that the behavioral rules are exogenously given. Consider
now that on the rst stage of the game both players select a behavioral rule, i.e.
they decide how to decide on prices or quantities (cf. Lipman 1991 on this idea).
An equilibrium concept requires that no player can benet from deviating from this
behavioral rule, given the rules of the other players. On the second stage the (optimal)
markups are chosen according to the selected behavioral prole on the rst stage.
In case of a non-observable choice of rules the players have to formulate consistent
beliefs about the opponents rules. This case is not considered throughout this paper.
A balanced parametrized behavioral prole where no player has an incentive to change
to another rule is called a balanced behavioral equilibrium prole (see Pasche (2001) for
details). With these denitions we can summarize the results discussed above:
Result 2.1. Consider a symmetric dierentiated duopoly with a linear demand scheme
and a quadratic cost function. Let the behavioral repertoire be 
 = ffC;fM;fNg in
case of quantity competition and 
 = ffB;fM;fNg in case of price competition. Then
we obtain the following results:
a) The balanced parametrized proles (fB;fM) and (fB;fN) have Bertrand-Stackel-
berg equilibrium outcomes where the markup player has the rst mover advanta-
ge. The balanced parametrized proles (fC;fM) and (fC;fN) have the Cournot-
Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes where the markup player has the rst mover
advantage.
b) The proles (fB;fB) and (fC;fC) are not balanced behavioral equilibria proles.

Proof:
a) The claim follows in a straightforward manner from computing the optimal m
j
and the corresponding payos (cf. equations ,(7), (8), (11) and (12)).
6b) The claim follows directly from a), since the Stackelberg rst mover position
implies NB = MB > BB and NC = MC > CC. Hence there is an incentive
to select rule fM (or fN) when the opponent is playing according to rule fB or
fC. 
The incentive to change from Cournot or Bertrand behavior to a markup rule does
not require that agents are able to compute the optimal markup exactly, even this is
possible with the assumptions about the given information. For a behavioral rule which
is often associated with \bounded rationality" it should be possible that the optimal
or even a suciently good markup can be achieved by simple learning procedures. The
set of all suciently good markups is dened by

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Result 2.2. The set MB
i is convex and m
i 2 MB
i . The same holds true for MC
i . 
Proof: In the economically reasonable range IR
+ the prots MB
i (resp. MC
i ) are
strictly concave in mi, which can easily be proven by calculating the second derivatives.
The convexity of MB
i and MC
i then follows from the epigraph theorem in standard






In addition to the convexity of MB
i resp. MC
i these sets have the advantage that
the player already knows one point on the boundary of the set: the markup mi on
variable cost which results from the behavioral proles (fB;fB) and (fC;fC), i.e. if
the players maximize prots. Making a (marginal) step into MB
i or MC
i then improves
the performance. The ability to learn suciently good markups is important because
in other scenarios (like in the (fM;fM) prole or in cases of demand uncertaity) the
calculation of the optimal m
i is analytically complex. In these cases learning procedures
or numerical recipes must be able to identify (almost) balanced parametrizations.
2.2 Mixing price and quantity decisions
Consider a two-stage game where on the rst stage the strategy variable (price or
quantity) is chosen and at the second stage the oligopoly game is conducted with payo
7maximizing players. By rearranging the linear demand scheme it is possible to express
the prots of player i as a function of qi and pj (resp. pi and qj). The corresponding
reaction function in quantities then depends on rivals price and vice versa. In case of
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i , i.e. choosing i =
qi; = 1;2 as the strategic variable is the dominant solution. It can be expected that
rational players will select the less competitive Cournot solution which depicts the
known results in the industrial organization literature (e.g. Singh/Vives 1984 among
others, cf. Kreps/Scheinkman 1983 for an alternative justication of Cournot behavior).
In case of markup rules it is an open question which strategy variable i will be selected.
Although the term markup pricing suggests price setting this is not neccessary the case.
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i = N(pj;mi) =
a(1   )   mi   c + pj




j = N(qi;mj) =
da + cb + bmj   dbqi
b + d
: (22)
The resulting equilibrium payos depend on mi;mj. Again, consider the case in which
a prot maximizing agent j plays against a markup agent i. Calculating the optimal
markups yields the following result.
Result 2.3. With an optimal markup m









j represent the Cournot-Stackelberg
8solution in case of i = xi and the Bertrand-Stackelberg solution in case of i = pi. In
both cases the solution is independent from j of the optimizing player. 
Proof: The claim follows in a straightforward manner by computing the equilibrium
payos (cf. (11), (12) in case of i = xi and (7), (8) in case of i = pi). 
Since the markup rule with balanced parametrization m
i is equal to the \rst move"
of the Stackelberg solution it is irrelevant for the optimzing agent whether he selects
the price or the quantity in order to maximze prots.
2.3 Pure markup equilibria
For the reaction functions (5) and (6) in case of i = j and (19) { (22) in case of
i 6= j ten dierent behavioral proles with markup rules are possible. The resulting
equilibrium payos are listed in appendix A. For arbitrarily parametrized behavioral
equilibria we obtain the result that in case of pure markup proles the outcome is
completely independent from the chosen strategy variable.






























i;mj)) the payos MN
i and NM
j are identical. 
Proof: The claims follows in a straightforward manner by computing the equilibrium
payos (cf. appendix A). 
With the exception of prole (fN;fN) with price and/or quantity strategies the cal-
culation of optimal markups is analytically dicult because m
j is a nonlinear reaction
function of mi and vice versa. But it is possible to prove that in the economically rea-
sonable part of the (m1;m2)-space all markup reaction functions are quasiconcave with
a positive intersection with the ordinate and hence have a unique symmetric solution.
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The following result is important to make some considerations about the degree of
competition when the players use dierent behavioral rules:
Result 2.5. Assume a balanced parametrization for all behavioral equilibria. Then it
follows that BB  NN  CC and BB  MM  CC independent from the chosen
strategy variables for fM;fN. 
Proof: Result 2.4 states the independence from the strategy variable for all mi;mj and
henceforth also for optimal m
i;m
j. In case of prole (fN;fN) the inequalities follow





















Z1db23(b(1 + d   ) + Z2)
(b(1 + ) + d)(Z2   b)2(b(1   )   Z2)2  0:
Since the equilibrium payo MM
i (m
i;m
j) is represented by an analytically exceedingly
long expression, the claim is proven in another way (see appendix B). 
The result that markets with the behavioral proles (fM;fM) and (fN;fN) are more
competitive than Cournot and less competitive than Bertrand does not imply that
these rules constitute balanced parametrized equilibrium proles.
Result 2.6. Consider i = qi and  > 0. Then (fN;fN) is not a balanced behavioral
equilibrium prole. 
Proof: Straightforward computation of the balanced equilibrium payos yields CN
i >
NN
i , i.e. if the opponent plays with rule fN there is an incentive to select fC. 
The results 2.1 and 2.6 imply that for a behavioral repertoire 
 = ffN;fCg only
(fN;fC) and (fC;fN) are balanced parametrized equilibrium proles. Henceforth the
equilibrium behavior is heterogeneous even if demand and cost functions are strictly
symmetric.
3 Endogenous Heterogeneity
The selected equilibrium prole and the associated outcomes depend on the repertoire 

and the chosen strategy variables. This will be demonstrated with a numerical example.
10Let a = 30;b = 1; = 0:5;c = 1;d = 1. Matrix 1 and 2 contain the equilibrium payos
for the cases 1 = 2 = x with 
 = ffC;fM;fNg and 1 = 2 = p with 
 =
ffB;fM;fNg. The matrix contains only the payos of the row player (for the column
player the payos are given by the transformed matrix due to symmetry reasons). Each
matrix has to be interpreted as a one-shot-game in which the rules are selected on the
rst stage, the optimal markups are chosen on the second stage and the market game
is conducted on the third stage.
Matrix 1 fC fM fN
fC 83.062 82.727 82.727
fM 83.083 82.719 82.693
fN 83.083 82.404 82.384
Matrix 2 fB fM fN
fB 81.481 82.514 82.514
fM 81.683 82.719 82.693
fN 81.683 82.404 82.384
In case of quantity strategies (matrix 1) we have four balanced equilibrium proles:
(fM;fC), (fN;fC), (fC;fM) and (fC;fN), all of them representing the Cournot-
Stackelberg solution and hence heterogeneous behavior of the two players. In case
of price competition (matrix 2) we have (fM;fM) as a unique equilibrium prole. If
one assumes one additional stage where the player rst decide on the strategy variable,
then on the behavioral rule, the parametrization and nally on the price or quantity
itself, we obtain the one-shot-game denoted in matrix 3. The markup rules now have
an index re
ecting the stratgy variable chosen on the rst stage.





fB 81.481 81.660 82.727 82.727 82.514 82.514
fC 82.868 83.062 82.727 82.727 82.514 82.514
fM
x 83.083 83.083 82.719 82.693 82.719 82.693
fN
x 83.083 83.083 82.404 82.384 82.404 82.384
fM
p 81.683 81.683 82.719 82.693 82.719 82.693
fN
p 81.683 81.683 82.404 82.384 82.404 82.384
In this case we have nine balanced behavioral equilibrium proles, namely all possi-









x ) and the prole (fM
p ;fM
p ). Optimizing behavior can but
need not be part of a behavioral equilibrium prole. In contrast, the presence of a mark-
up heuristic is neccessary. Note that the pure markup equilibrium prole (fM
p ;fM
p ) is
Pareto-dominated by the other equilibrium proles. But in (fM
p ;fM
p ) the Nash equili-
brium condition is strictly fullled while in the Cournot-Stackelberg cases there is an
indierence between fB and fC on the one hand and between fM
x and fN
x on the other
had. Since the optimizers strategy variable is irrelevant in these cases it is possible
to assume price setting behavior while the markup agent adjusts the quantity to ac-
chieve the optimal markup. Not only in behavioral equilibria with given rules, but also
in almost all balanced behavioral equilibrium proles the behavior of the duopolists
is dierent. This heterogeneity is not due to an asymmetric demand scheme, die-
rent production techniques or other exogenous reasons, but is a result of the strategic
interdependence.
In contrast to the set of strategies and parameters the behavioral repertoire 
 cannot
be considered as exogenously given to the players. The behavioral rules are rather
created by experimentation, learning, habit formation and so on. While the choice of
optimal strategies and markups can be modelled as an optimization problem, this is an
articial assumption in case of choosing the rules. Especially in case of applying new
or modied behavioral rules it is not possible to explain this by optimizing behavior
since optimizing presumes a closed set of well known alternatives. Instead, the set 
 is
principally open. A closed and well dened set 
, however, may be useful for analysing
the comparative performance of dierent rules, detecting equilibria proles and the
conditions under which some rules are part of an equilibrium. If 
 is an open set there
is no possibility to derive optimal parametrizations analytically. Then the behavior of
oligopolistic players may be a drift in price-quantity space. Such a \market without
equilibrium" (v. Stackelberg) can then be interpreted as a result of an agents search
of rules which improve performance.
Do there exist behavioral rules which lead to perfect collusion? Rules which lead to
higher payos than markup rules also have at least one free parameter which can be
chosen optimally. In the (i;j)-space each balanced parametrized reaction function
will lead to a tangential solution where the slope of js reaction function equals the
slope of the highest possible iso-prot curve of player i. In the symmetric duopoly,
perfect collusion implies that the slopes of the iso-prot curves are identical and equal
to one, hence also the reaction functions must possess this slope. One may construct
12such functions even for the static game. But they are not plausible because the unique
intersection point would be dynamically unstable (cf. Dixit 1986). For this reason it
is not reasonable to expect collusion rules for static games. Since we have seen that
multiple behavioral equilibrium proles exist, one may think about trigger strategies
in iterated games which lead to collusive behavior on stages t < T (with T as the last
stage of the game).
4 Discussion
In order to take simple but empirically relevant decision rules into account we employed
two dierent markup heuristics in a symmetric duopoly model. It was shown that
depending on the chosen markups the presence of these rules leads to Stackelberg
outcomes when the markup rule has the rst mover advantage. Hence there is an
incentive for (at least) one player to deviate from optimizing and turning towards
markup behavior. Pure Cournot or Bertrand behavior does not represent a behavioral
equilibrium prole. Furthermore, it was shown that pure markup behavior is more
competitive than Cournot and less competitive than Bertrand, independent of the
chosen strategic variable (price or quantity). It turned out that in case of a combination
of markup and optimizing behavior only the strategy variable of the markup agent
determines the outcome.
It is questionable how it can be justied that payo optimzing behavior is \full ratio-
nal", like the decision theoretic position claims, while this behavior can be outperformed
by simple rules and does not constitute a behavioral equilibrium prole. To what ex-
tent does it make sense to call agents only \boundedly rational", when they are able to
anticipate equilibrium proles and hence select best performing simple heuristics? Lip-
man (1991) argues that no logical inconsistency exists in modelling bounded rationality
by \optimal" decision making about how to make decisions. The extended notion of
(behavioral) equilibrium used in this paper requires also another notion of rationality
in an explicative and a normative sense (cf. G uth/Kliemt 2001 on this topic).
Furthermore, the question arises whether the concept of a representative rm is valid
since behavioral equilibrium proles are constituted by heterogeneous rules. The idea
of a representative rm requires that for each rm an incentive exists to behave in
the same way like all other rms do. The concept of behavioral equilibrium proles
instead may imply (depending on 
) that a rm behaves according to rule f1 because
13the other rm decides according rule f2 and vice versa even in case of completely
symmetric conditions.
It seems promising to extend the present model in several ways: An extension to n
players requires simpler demand and cost functions but may lead to more complex
balanced behavioral equilibrium proles. Furthermore the selection of rules and para-
metrizations can be analyzed under the assumption that the rivals rule is not obser-
vable. The decision is then also based on expectations. In addition, it is reasonable to
assume some uncertainty regarding the demand scheme and the cost function of other
players. Finally, an extension to multi-period market games in order to study e.g. mark-
up adaption procedures will be interesting. From a methodological point of view the
relation between the concept of (balanced) behavioral equilibria proles and the con-
cepts of evolutionary game theory and Darwinian dynamics require further studies (cf.
Rhode/Stegeman 2001, Qin/Stuart 1997).
Appendix A
The payos are calculated by solving the corresponding system of reaction functions
(cf. eq. (19) { (22)). Let Z3 = (b + d), Z4 = (1   ), Z5 = (mi   1).
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i with arbitrary i;j for the markup rule and balanced
parametrization: Note that MM
i is independent from i;j (result 2.4). Since a balan-
ced parametrization is symmetric let mj = mi. In a behavioral equilibrium we have
q
i(mi;mj) = q
j(mi;mj) = q(mi). Solving q(mi) = qc
i to mi, where qc
i is the Cournot



















(1 + ) + d)W1
 0
with W1 = bd(   2) + b2
(2 +    2)   2d(b
 + d) < 0. The partial derivative is
negative (or zero). This indicates that mc
i is not optimal and that there is an incentive
for both players to decrease the markup. Since the markup reaction function is strictly
quasiconcave and there is a unique solution m
i = m
j it follows that mc
i  m
i. Hence,
in a balanced parametrized equilibrium a lower iso-payo curve can be achieved as in
the Cournot case. Solving q(mi) = qb
i to mi, where qb
i is the Bertrand quantity, we















b((1   )   2)   d(1 + 
))2db2W2
(bZ4 + Z2)3(b
(1 + ) + d)W3
 0
with W2 = b(1 + 
(1 + )   2) + 2d > 0 and W3 = 
b2(2   )(1   2) + ab(Z4(2 +
) + 2
) + 2d2 > 0 is positive (or zero). This indicates that there is an incentive for
both players to increase the markup. Hence, in a balanced parametrized equilibrium
a higher iso-payo curve can be achieved as in the Bertrand case. This completes the
proof.
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